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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

20 July 1959

DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR-Poland: Khrushchev's pledge at Szczecin on 17 July to defend both the frontier between East and West Germany and the Oder-Neisse line was probably intended to reassure the Poles, during this period of East-West negotiations, that Moscow would permit no change in the status quo in Eastern Europe. He probably also intended to warn the West that any solution to the Berlin-German problem must be based on a "two Germanys" approach in order to put at rest any hope for a reunified Germany which would be either Western oriented or independent. His endorsement of Gomulka and Polish agricultural policies may sharpen the contrast between liberal Polish practices and the increasingly restrictive measures followed in the other satellites.

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USSR: Gromyko has shown interest in suggestions made by Dag Hammarskjold for creating a tenation subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission to be

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[composed of five Western, three bloc, and two neutral countries. The Soviet foreign minister observed that agreement could be reached quickly if the matter were raised informally at the foreign ministers' conference. Moscow probably believes that since disarmament can be expected to be on the agenda of any summit conference, such a group would provide a useful forum to which to refer the negotiations at the close of the heads-of-government talks.]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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III. THE WEST

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France: Premier Debré, in a further effort to halt proposed US arms shipments to Tunisia, has charged that arms and ammunition of US manufacture have been found in possession of the Algerian rebels, possibly passed to them by Tunis. Debré told Ambassador Houghton in Paris that shipments of US arms to Tunisia should be held up pending an investigation. Meanwhile, tension is reported building up along the Tunisian-Algerian border, apparently as an aftermath of the 14 July rebel attack on a French outpost.

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DAILY BRIEF

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LATE ITEMS

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*Iraq: The violent disorders in Kirkuk which began on 14 July apparently have been suppressed. Prime Minister Qasim on 19 July publicly condemned the violence there and threatened "severe punishment" for the instigators, as well as for potential troublemakers elsewhere in Iraq. Qasim stated that the authorities will deal with "enemies of the people." The Communists, acting on the occasion of the celebration of the Iraqi revolution on 14 July, precipitated the outbreak by playing on the traditional hatred between Kurdish and Turkoman elements. [Insubordinate army units joined the Communists in the disorders.]

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*Cuba: President Urrutia's forced resignation on 17 July has again demonstrated Fidel Castro's wide support among the Cuban masses. He is expected to use this support to try to isolate his opposition, which he contends emanates largely from a reactionary minority with special interests. Castro's dictatorial action against Urrutia, however, may weaken his position among segments of the important middle class, where respect for democratic forms has always been strongest. Newly appointed President Dorticos, who is likely to be a pliant front man for Castro, has announced that the cabinet will remain unchanged at this time. Communist demands for representation in top government positions are unlikely to be acceded to, at least in the near future. The Communists, however, are doubtless encouraged by Urrutia's ouster, which apparently was brought on in part by the former President's strong anti-Communist statements of 13 July.

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Khrushchev in Poland

While many of Khrushchev's public remarks since his arrival in Poland on 14 July have been devoted to foreign policy issues, he has chosen topics which are of special interest to the Poles. At Szczecin on 17 July, he avoided direct reference to the talks in Geneva, but reaffirmed that the USSR "firmly defends and will defend" its proposals on Germany and Berlin.

In an effort to reassure the Poles that any future East-West agreements would preserve the status quo in Eastern Europe, he pledged Moscow's continued support for preserving both the frontier between East and West Germany and Oder-Neisse line "as if they were Soviet borders." This statement probably was also intended as a warning to the West that any solution to the Berlin-German problem must be negotiated in the context of "two Germanys" in order to put at rest any hopes for a reunified Germany which would be either Western oriented or independent.

Khrushchev's reiteration of his plea for a Baltic "zone of peace" and warnings against the establishment of Western rocket and nuclear bases on Scandinavian soil were probably in anticipation of a major theme during his forthcoming Scandinavian visit.

The premier's firm endorsement of Polish party leader Gomulka is the most important development in Soviet-Polish relations to come from Khrushchev's visit, which is his first official one to Poland since the "Polish October" three years ago. Praising Polish developments in general, Khrushchev announced at Poznan on 18 July his support of Gomulka's slow agricultural socialization program; at least, he endorsed Gomulka's concept that socialization can be achieved only by voluntary methods and open peasant support.

Khrushchev thus accepted Gomulka's cautious moves in this controversial field at a time when other satellites are intensifying

their programs to achieve a realization of socialism by 1965. The differences in speed of socialist construction among the satellites is a potential source of intrabloc friction.

Khrushchev emphasized repeatedly the strength and industrial power of the USSR in a fairly direct effort to impress the Polish people and leaders with the validity of Soviet policies and the virtues accruing to those who "march along together" on the road to socialism. The latter point implies greater encouragement to the Polish party to speed up its advance to socialism and may have been designed to encourage a narrowing of the differences between Poland and the bloc. [REDACTED]

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Plan for UN Disarmament Commission Subcommittee

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[UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold on 14 July outlined to Secretary Herter a plan for organizing the Disarmament Commission which he said he had discussed at length with Soviet UN delegate Zorin six months ago. Hammarskjold's proposal would create a bureau to be composed of a chairman and rapporteur from the neutral countries and two vice chairmen, one from a bloc country other than the Soviet Union and the other from a small Western nation. To this group would be added the US, the UK, France, and the USSR to form a subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission. Hammarskjold agreed that one additional representative from each side might be added, making a ten-nation body composed of five Western, three bloc, and two neutral nations.]

[Hammarskjold approached Gromyko [] with his proposal but did not mention specific nations. Gromyko viewed the plan with interest, stating he was convinced that if the matter were raised informally among the four foreign ministers, agreement would be reached quickly. He said he favored keeping the forum small and added that parity would not be a necessary ingredient.]

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[Moscow probably believes that, in view of the probability of the disarmament issue appearing on the agenda of any summit conference, a body along the lines of Hammarskjold's suggestion would provide a useful forum to which to refer negotiations on this subject at the close of the heads-of-government talks--in particular negotiations on Soviet proposals for disengagement in Central Europe, atom- and rocket-free zones, and troop and armaments cuts. Moscow might also hope that such a body could exploit the Irish proposal for preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, which the Czech representative to the United Nations told the Dutch representative Prague would support.] []

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LATE ITEM

The Iraqi Situation

The violence which began in Kirkuk on 14 July during celebrations of last year's revolution apparently has been suppressed. Local Communists capitalized on the traditional hatred between Kurds and Turkomans to create an incident which developed into widespread street fighting. Armed Communists, heavily armed Popular Resistance Forces, and some army elements killed a number of leading notables and dragged their bodies through the streets.

[The acting commander of the 2nd Division headquarters of which are at Kirkuk, was unable to control his own troops and reportedly was compelled by Communist officers and men to remain in his headquarters. Communist soldiers and Popular Resistance men killed the divisional intelligence officer and several other officers.]

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[A large number of officers of this division were purged following the Mosul rebellion last March and were replaced by reserve officers, many of them Communists. The division's previous, pro-Communist commander had since March--without authority--armed the Popular Resistance with numerous automatic weapons. The combination of these circumstances emboldened the Communists to act.]

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In a speech on 19 July, Prime Minister Qasim publicly condemned the outbreak in Kirkuk and threatened "severe punishment" for the instigators, as well as for any potential troublemakers elsewhere in Iraq. Qasim warned the Communists and other self-appointed guardians of the state not to take the law into their own hands, stating that the authorities will deal with "enemies of the people." He implied that "naive" soldiers at Kirkuk had been deceived by some subordinate officers and declared, "Soldiers must obey orders issued by their officers and the Supreme Command."

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